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Abstract. Most safety-critical systems must undergo assurance and certification 
processes. The associated activities can be complex and labour-intensive, thus 
practitioners need suitable means to execute them. The activities are further 
becoming more challenging as a result of the evolution of the systems towards 
cyber-physical ones, as these systems have new assurance and certification 
needs. The AMASS project (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless 
Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems) tackled these issues by 
creating and consolidating the de-facto European-wide open tool platform, 
ecosystem, and self-sustainable community for assurance and certification of 
cyber-physical systems. The project defined a novel holistic approach for 
architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless 
interoperability, and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets. AMASS 
results were applied in 11 industrial case studies to demonstrate the reduction of 
effort in assurance and certification, the reduction of (re)certification cost, the 
reduction of assurance and certification risks, and the increase in technology 
harmonisation and interoperability. 
Keywords: AMASS, cyber-physical system, CPS, assurance, certification.  
1 Introduction 
Safety-critical systems are usually subject to rigorous assurance and certification 
processes to provide confidence that the systems are dependable [18], i.e. acceptably 
safe, reliable, etc. This is typically performed in compliance with standards, e.g. ISO 
26262 in automotive and DO-178C in avionics, and is a requirement so that the systems 
are allowed to operate. The associated activities are usually complex and labour-
intensive because of the large set of compliance criteria to fulfil, the amount of 
assurance evidence to manage, and the need for providing valid justifications of system 
dependability, among other issues [18]. Therefore, practitioners need support. 
Safety-critical systems have also significantly increased in technical complexity and 
sophistication toward open, interconnected, networked systems such as "the connected 
car". This has brought a “cyber-physical” dimension with it, exacerbating the problem 
of ensuring dependability in the presence of human, environmental, and technological 
risks. New approaches for assurance and certification are needed so that these activities 
are cost-effective. The approaches must consider the new system characteristics, e.g. 
new architectures and the need for guaranteeing several dependability concerns, and 
provide means that facilitate the collection, management, and reuse of assurance assets. 
The AMASS project (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance 
and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems; [1]) created and consolidated the de-facto 
European-wide open tool platform, ecosystem, and self-sustainable community for 
assurance and certification of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the largest industrial 
vertical markets including automotive, railway, aerospace, space, and energy.  
The ultimate goal of AMASS was to lower certification costs for CPS in face of 
rapidly changing features and market needs. This was achieved by establishing a novel 
holistic approach for architecture-driven assurance (fully compatible with standards 
such as SysML), multi-concern assurance (for co-analysis and co-assurance of e.g. 
security and safety aspects), seamless interoperability between assurance and 
engineering activities along with third-parties (e.g. supplier assurance), and cross- and 
intra-domain reuse of assurance assets (e.g. of assurance evidence between projects). 
The AMASS project started in April 2016 and finished in March 2019. AMASS 
work built on the results from previous successful EU projects such as OPENCOSS 
[21], SafeCer [26], CRYSTAL [14], and CHESS [12]. Results from these projects were 
integrated and further developed in AMASS. 
The next sections summarise the AMASS project by presenting its objectives, its 
organisation, and its main outcomes. Our purpose is to raise the awareness about the 
project and its results, including its open source community, so that further people and 
other projects continue researching on and developing solutions for assurance and 
certification from AMASS outcomes. Prior publications [10] provide further details 
about the motivation for the project [25], the process for approach application [15], and 
the Eclipse open source project [16,17]. Publications on specific research topics are 
also available, e.g. on quality analysis of system artefacts for assurance [22]. More 
information about the project and its results are available in AMASS deliverables [2]. 
2 Project Objectives 
The high-level goals of AMASS were the demonstration of: 
1. G1: A potential gain for design efficiency of complex CPS by reducing their 
assurance and certification effort by 50%; 
2. G2: A potential reuse of assurance results (qualified or certified before), leading 
to 40% of cost reductions for product (re)certification activities; 
3. G3: A potential raise of technology innovation led by 35% reduction of 
assurance and certification risks of new CPS products, and; 
4. G4: A potential sustainable impact in CPS industry by increasing the 
harmonization and interoperability of assurance and certification tool 
technologies by 60%. 
To achieve the goals, these project objectives were specified: 
• O1: Define a holistic approach for architecture-driven assurance to leverage the 
reuse opportunities in assurance and certification by directly and explicitly 
addressing current technologies and hardware and software architectures needs. 
• O2: Define a multi-concern assurance approach to ensure not only safety and 
security, but also other dependability aspects such as availability and reliability. 
• O3: Consolidate a cross-domain and intra-domain assurance reuse approach to 
improve mutual recognition agreement of compliance approvals and to help 
assess the return of investment of reuse decisions. 
• O4: Develop a fully-fledged open tool platform that allows developers and 
other assurance stakeholders to guarantee seamless interoperability of the 
platform with other tools used in the development of CPSs. 
• O5: Benchmark the tool infrastructure against real industrial cases in relevant 
environments. 
• O6: Consolidate the AMASS ecosystem and community for: 
o O6.a: Adoption of the AMASS conceptual and methodological 
approach as a reference tool architecture for CPS assurance and 
certification. 
o O6.b: Maintenance and further development of the open tool platform 
as a long-term, API-standardized, and industry-driven assurance and 
certification environment. 
The main envisioned impact on the different stakeholders is as follows:  
• OEMs (including system integrators) and Component suppliers can use 
AMASS results to increase CPS design cost-effectiveness, ease innovation, and 
reduce the costs and risks of CPS assurance and certification. 
• Assessors and Certification authorities can provide services that better fit CPS-
specific needs. 
• Tool vendors can extend their products with new features and integrate them 
with AMASS tools. 
• European society will benefit from the use of CPS with a higher confidence in 
their dependability. 
3 Organisation 
The AMASS consortium (Table 1) consisted of 29 partners from eight countries and 
covered the whole value chain for CPS assurance and certification. The project manager 
was Alejandra Ruiz (Tecnalia R&I), the technical manager was Barbara Gallina 
(Mälardalen University), and the quality manager was Cristina Martínez (Tecnalia 
R&I). Information about other roles and the implementation plan structure is available 
online [9]. AMASS also had an External Advisory Board [8] that included 14 relevant 
and influential experts on the topics of the project, including assessors, assurance and 
certification managers, consultants, engineers, and researchers. This board advised on 
technical decisions, standardization, and community building. 
The industrial application of AMASS was analysed in 11 case studies [3] from air 
traffic management, automotive, avionics, industrial automation, railway, and space, 
e.g. on autonomous driving features and satellite software design. The AMASS partners 
established links with related ongoing EU projects for networking, discussion, and 
collaboration, such as AQUAS [11], CP-SETIS [13], PDP4E [23], RobMosys [24], and 
SafeCOP [27]. AMASS also established links with national projects. Result 
standardisation was addressed, e.g. through system assurance work at OMG [19]. 
Table 1. AMASS partners per country and their main role in the value chain: ASR – Assessor, 
CER – Certification Authority, COS – Component Supplier, OEM – Original Equipment 
Manufacturer, RES – research, TOV – Tool Vendor 
Country Partner Role  Country Partner Role 
AT 
AIT RES  
FR 
ALL4TEC TOV 
Virtual Vehicle RES  Alstom Transport OEM 
CZ 
Honeywell COS  CEA List RES 
Masaryk Uni. RES  ClearSy COS 
DE 
Ansys medini TOV  
IT 
FBK RES 
Assystem TOV  Intecs ASR 
Eclipse Found. TOV  Rina CER 
Infineon COS  Thales OEM 




Carlos III Uni. RES  Comentor ASR 
GMV COS  Mälardalen Uni. RES 
Schneider Electric OEM  OHB COS 
Tecnalia R & I RES  RISE RES 
Thales Alenia COS  UK Rapita Systems TOV 
The REUSE Co. TOV     
4 Main Outcomes 
AMASS resulted in three main tangible outcomes. 
The AMASS Reference Tool Architecture (Fig. 1; [5]) provides a conceptual 
framework for architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless 
interoperability, and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets. It contains both 
technological building blocks such as System architecture modelling for assurance and 
Tool integration management, and the Common Assurance & Certification Metamodel, 
which provides an information model for CPS assurance and certification, e.g. for 
Compliance management and for Assurance case specification. 
 
 
Fig. 1. AMASS Reference Tool Architecture 
The AMASS Tool Platform (Fig. 2; [6]) is a collaborative tool environment that 
represents a concrete implementation of the AMASS Reference Tool Architecture with 
capability for evolution and adaptation. It is released as an open technological solution 
that integrates and extends different existing open source tools for system modelling 
and analysis (Papyrus, CHESS, Concerto-FLA), compliance management and 
argumentation (OpenCert), process engineering (EPF-Composer), variability 
management (BVR), and traceability (Capra). It is further integrated with over a dozen 
external tools that provide additional features; usually commercial ones. 
The Open AMASS Community [7] manages the main project results for 
maintenance, evolution and industrialization. The Open Community is supported by a 
governance board and by rules, policies, and quality models. This includes support for 
AMASS base tools and for extension tools. The OpenCert project of PolarSys/Eclipse 
[20] hosts the Community. 
The achievement of the AMASS goals thanks to these outcomes was demonstrated 
in the industrial case studies [4]. The achievement varied among the case studies 
because of their different characteristics (e.g. different base situation) and the different 
features applied. Videos demonstrating AMASS outcomes are available online [28]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. General view of the AMASS Tool Platform and its ecosystem 
5 Conclusion 
The AMASS project developed a novel approach for CPS assurance and certification 
by addressing architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless 
interoperability, and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets. The approach 
integrated and further developed results from other projects and resulted in three main 
tangible outcomes: the AMASS Reference Tool Architecture, the AMASS Tool 
Platform, and the Open AMASS Community. The benefits from using the outcomes 
were demonstrated in 11 industrial case studies.  
We expect that further researchers and practitioners gain interest in AMASS results 
thanks to the summary presented. They could exploit the results in activities dealing 
with process or product improvement, mainly for critical systems. New collaborations 
on assurance and certification could also be created, e.g. around the open community. 
We plan to continue working on CPS assurance and certification in the future from 
the results developed in AMASS. This includes the development of novel solutions for 
advanced assurance case management and for privacy assurance.  
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